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Gun Control Statutes and Domestic Violence
Elmer A. Bessick*
T HE WIDESPREAD INCREASE IN CRIME in modern society has bred a re-
action of strict law enforcement, or what may be termed "the law
and order syndrome." As the crime rate steadily increases,1 public sen-
timent for some sort of strong crime control becomes insistent. It is
difficult to pinpoint any single factor which can be called the culprit for
the nationwide increase in crime. Certainly, there are a number of fac-
tors which contribute in some fashion to this broad scale crime increase.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation lists a total of eleven "crime fac-
tors" which include such diverse elements as poverty, education, size
of police force, race, age and sex, etc.2
Numerous blue ribbon commissions 3 have issued reports as to the
causes of national crime and violence, and each has pointed to the same
conclusion-that there is no single factor which can be determined as
the cause of the crime and violence now rampant in our society. At best,
these reports show some relation between hunger, poverty, environment,
organized crime and law enforcement, and national violence. These
problems are certainly not incurable; their solutions are frequently ex-
pensive and time consuming. No immediate solutions are readily avail-
able. Urban Renewal, Fair Housing, Education and Job Training are
part of the long-term care, but they do little in treating the symptoms
manifested by crime and violence. The public seeks some sort of realistic
approach to the problems of crime and violence. Among these proposed
solutions, one eagerly urged is Gun Control Law.
President Lyndon B. Johnson, in his farewell State of the Union
Message to Congress on January 14, 1969, stated that "one of my great-
est disappointments is our failure to secure passage of a licensing and
registration act for firearms." 4 This attitude is typical of the national
reaction to the assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy and Dr.
Martin Luther King. The need for some sort of effective regulation of
firearms has been emphasized by these outbreaks of violence.
The prime question for determination in the area of firearms control
is: Can gun control be effective to reduce crime and violence? If the
* B.A., Bowling Green State University; Third-Year Student at Cleveland State
University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
1 1968 F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports 1.
2 Id., vi.
3 See generally The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administra-
tion of Justice (Feb. 1967); National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence (Sept. 1969); American Bar Foundation Report: Firearms and Legislative
Regulations (1967).
4 1 U.S. Cong. News (1969) 4, 9.
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answer to this question is at least partially affirmative, then control of
firearms would seem to be desirable. To test their effectiveness, we first
must look to the character of criminal behavior.
A leading authority in the field of criminal behavior today is Dr.
Marvin Wolfgang of Pennsylvania University. His book, Patterns of
Criminal Homicide,5 is considered the standard text in the field. His
studies in criminal behavior have led to the formulation of what has
been called Wolfgang's Law: Homicide will occur whether there is a
gun or not! Wolfgang writes: "Few homicides due to shootings could
be avoided merely if a firearm was not immediately present, for the
offender would select some other weapon to achieve the same destructive
goal." 6
The nationwide riots which have hit some of our major cities these
last few years have done a great deal to foster a national gun reaction.
The violence and destruction of the riots prompted a great many to
acquire firearms, ostensibly for protection. "After disturbances in Balti-
more and Washington in April 1968, applications for handgun purchases
nearly doubled in counties surrounding the two cities. In Alexandria,
Virginia, suburbanites stood in lines to buy guns during the height of the
rioting in the District of Columbia, and more applications were received
in the first half of April than in the entire month of March," 7 and in
Detroit "in the eleven month period since the riots, almost as many
licenses to purchase guns have been issued as in the thirty months pre-
ceding the riots." 8
A Stanford Research Institute Study of "Firearms, Violence and
Civil Disorders" 9 concludes that in the case of the Newark and Detroit
riots, "the role of guns by civilians was minimal, and the role of guns by
public safety personnel was not," 10 but later predicts that "with the
buildup of guns in private hands, many public officials are beginning to
fear that the statistics of the past will not be applicable to the future.
The role of guns by civilians may not be minimal." 11
There is a long-standing American tradition which has evolved from
the half-historic, half-romantic heritage of the American frontier. Amer-
icans trace their traditional affinity for firearms to the early days of the
westward movement, frontier civilization, and back eventually to the
5 Wolfgang, Patterns of Criminal Homicide (Science ed., 1966).
6 Mosk, Gun Control Legislation: Valid and Necessary, 14 N.Y. Law Forum, 714
(Winter 1968).
7 Firearms in Civil Disorders, Current (Jan. 1969), at 43.
8 Ibid.
9 Firearms, Violence and Civil Disorders, Stanford Research Institute Journal, Oc-
tober, 1968.
10 Supra n. 7.
11 Ibid.
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colonial militia men. Since firearms have played an integral part in the
history and development of this nation, it is difficult to alter the "habit"
of firearms, they say. The National Commission on The Causes and
Prevention of Violence, in a staff report,12 seriously questions the utility
of firearms for defense of home and person. In that report, the Commis-
sion's staff concluded that the gun is rarely effective as a means of pro-
tecting the home from either the burglar or robber. The Commission
reasons that the burglar avoids confrontation and the robber confronts
too swiftly. Although the possession of firearms seems to afford a great
deal of comfort to many Americans, the report suggests that this com-
fort is largely an illusion bought with the blood of more frequent hom-
icides, increased accidents, and more widespread illegal use of guns.
13
Certainly this by no means negates the possible advantages of gun
ownership; but it does call into serious doubt the advisability of un-
restricted possession of such firearms. Today in America, approximately
60 million households contain an estimated 90 million firearms. If we
disregard the "long guns" (i.e., the 35 million rifles and 31 million shot-
guns) as exclusively sporting weapons, there would still be 24 million
handguns in private hands.1
4
The easy access that Americans have to firearms, due to the rel-
atively large number of guns available, accentuates the problem of hu-
man instability. The most dangerous aspect of firearms is that they
may be fired in a split second by one who possesses no great strength
or skill. Assuming that relatively few accidents are caused by a failure
of the gun's mechanism itself, we are then faced with the unpredictable
element of human impulse. As Robert Coles, Research Psychiatrist of
the Harvard University Health Services, writes:
Every psychiatrist has treated patients who were thankful that guns
were not around at one time or another in their lives. Temper
tantrums, fits, seizures, hysterical episodes all make the presence
of guns an additional and possibly mortal danger. . . We cannot
prevent insanity in adults or violent and delinquent urges in many
children by curbing guns, but we can certainly make the translation
of crazy or vicious impulses into pulled triggers less likely and less
possible. 15
The Federal Bureau of Investigation publishes its Annual Report of
Crime in the United States which includes a detailed analysis of crime
trends and statistics. In its last published Report, 16 the F.B.I. included
the following chart:
12 National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Firearms and
Violence in American Life, a Staff Report (Sept. 1969).
13 Id. at 68.
14 Id. at 7.
15 Coles, "America Amok," The New Republic (Aug. 13, 1966), at 14.
16 1968 F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports, vi.
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Spouse Parent Other Triangle Known Suspected
Killing Killing Family & Lovers' Other Felony Felony
Region Spouse Child Killings Quarrels Arguments Types Types
Northeastern
States 11.8 3.7 6.6 6.4 39.3 20.2 12.0
*Northcentral
States 13.3 3.6 10.7 6.4 39.4 20.1 6.5
Seuthern
States 14.6 2.1 9.2 7.8 48.4 12.0 5.9
Western
States 14.1 5.8 6.1 7.6 33.5 25.0 7.9
Total 13.7 3.3 8.7 7.2 42.2 17.4 7.5
(*Includes Ohio)
From these reported statistics, some important observations may be
made. If we combine the percentages of "Known Felony-type Murders"
and "Suspected Felony-type Murders" into one grouping, we find a 24.9%
national average for felony murders. The familial murders' s total
25.7% and those romance-linked killings total 7.2%. The "other argu-
ment" group, by far the largest, accounts for 42.2% of the total reported
murders. The F.B.I. concludes that "most murders are committed by
relatives of the victim or persons acquainted with the victim. It follows,
therefore, that criminal homicide is, to a major extent a national social
problem beyond police prevention." 19
As the F.B.I. has examined the various circumstances of murders,
it has also made a detailed study of the weapons used in criminal homi-
cides based upon studies of murder victims. Their statistics show both
totals and percentages for calendar year 1968.
MURDER VICTIMS-WEAPONS USED, 196820
Personal
Cut- Blunt Weapons Other
ting Objects (Strang- (Drown-
or (Club, ulations ings, Unknown
Num- Stab- Hammer, and Explo- Arson, and not
ber Guns bing etc.) Beatings) Poison sives etc.) Stated
12,508 8,105 2,317 713 936 13 6 294 119
100% 64.8% 18.5% 5.7% 7.5% .1% Less 2.4% 1.0%
than
.1%
17 Id. at 8.
18 Familial Murders include Spouse killing Spouse, Parent killing Child, and Other
Family Killings. Note categories which are treated as one because of the kinship
relationship of the victim to the killer.
19 Supra n. 17.
20 1968 F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports, 108.
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And these same figures are further broken down into the geographic
regions of the country:
MURDER, TYPE OF WEAPONS USED-PERCENT
2 1
Knife or Other Other Weapons Personal
Region Firearms Cutting Instrument (Club, Poison, etc.) Weapons
Northeastern
States 45.7% 30.9% 12.3% 11.1%
*Northcentral
States 69.8% 15.7% 7.4% 7.1%
Southern
States 73.2% 15.8% 6.3% 4.7%
Western
States 60.5% 16.9% 10.5% 12.1%
Total 65.4% 18.7% 8.3% 7.6%
(*Includes Ohio)
From the above quoted F.B.I. statistics, it is virtually impossible not to
conclude that guns are the major vehicle of criminal homicide in the
United States.
Once there has been established a definite correlation between
crime and violence, especially "domestic homicide" as opposed to "Fel-
ony-related homicide," and the accessibility of firearms, it is only a
logical step to turn to the regulations of firearms as a partial cure for
the rising homicide rates. Many cities, notably Philadelphia,
2 2 Chicago,23
Washington, D.C.,2 4 Miami, 23 San Francisco, 26 and New York City,2 7 as
well as the states of New Jersey,28 Massachusetts 29 and Illinois,3 0 have
enacted gun control legislation. City of Toledo3 ' (Lucas County) Ohio
and the Cities of University Heights 32 and East Cleveland 33 (Cuyahoga
County) in Ohio, have enacted gun control ordinances based upon the
Toledo Ordinance.
3 4
21 Id. at 8.
22 Phila., Pa., Ordinance 560 (April 15, 1965).
23 Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code, Chs. 11.1-11.2 (1968).
24 Dist. of Columbia, Police Regulation, Arts. 51, 54 (1968).
25 Miami, Fla., Code § 25.104-25.119, Ch. 61, § 61-1 (1968).
26 San Francisco, Cal., Municipal Code, Ch. VII, pt. II, 1(610-610.8), (1968).
27 N. Y. City, N. Y., Administrative Code, § 436-6.0 through 6.16 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
28 N. J. Stat. Ann., § 2 A:151 (1953).
29 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., Ch. 737 (Cum. Summary, 1968).
30 Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, § 83-1 et seq. (Cum. Supp., 1969).
31 Toledo, Ohio, Municipal Ordinance No. 719-68 (Toledo Municipal Code, Ch. 17,
Art. 19, § 1-15 (1969).
32 University Heights, Ohio, Municipal Ordinance No. 69-87 (Codified Ordinances,
Part V, Ch. 593 (1969).
33 East Cleveland, Ohio, Emergency Ordinance No. 6105 (July 29, 1969) (Codified
Ordinances, § 545.11 through 545.25).
34 Supra n. 31.
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Critics of gun control legislation seek refuge in the United States
Constitution for protection of what they term "the right to bear arms."
Both the language and the logic of their position springs from the Second
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution:
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.35
If the language of "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall
not be infringed" is to be viewed alone, without reference to the other
clauses of the Second Amendment, then the language would appear to be
absolute. This would support the position of gun control opponents.
But, if the Second Amendment language were to be viewed as a single
prohibition, with reference to "a well regulated Militia," then it would
appear that it only would be a bar in those cases where there would be
an attempt to control weapons of the military.
There have been several landmark decisions handed down by the
United States Supreme Court in the area of Second Amendment Rights.
Probably the cornerstone for all judicial interpretations of the Second
Amendment has been the case of United States v. Cruikshank.36 The
Court there ordered charges of conspiracy to prevent Negroes from bear-
ing arms for lawful purposes, dismissed on the ground that "bearing
arms for lawful purpose (s) . . .is not a right granted by the Constitu-
tion." 37
The Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Waite, explained
that:
The Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but
this, as has been seen, means no more than it shall not be infringed
by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect
than to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the
people to look for their protection against any violation by their
fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes to the States .. .38
Eleven years later, in 1886, when presented with the Illinois statute
which prohibited the assembly of military groups under arms in either
cities or towns unless authorized by law, the Court, in Presser v. Illi-
nois, 3 9 held that there were no Second Amendment infringements. The
Court cited and followed Cruikshank,40 stating that "a conclusive answer
to the contention that this amendment prohibits the legislation in ques-
tion lies in the fact that the amendment is a limitation only upon the
35 U.S. Const. amend II.
36 92 U.S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875).
37 Id. at 553.
38 Ibid.
39 116 U.S. 252, 6 S. Ct. 1018 (1885).
40 Supra n. 36.
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power of Congress and the National Government, and not upon that of
the States." 41
The Supreme Court, in 1894, in the case of Miller v. Texas42 and
again in 1939 in U. S. v. Miller,43 upheld gun control restrictions. In
Miller v. Texas,44 the Court held that a Texas statute which prohibited
the carrying of dangerous weapons was valid because Second Amend-
ment limitations have "no reference whatsoever to proceedings in state
courts." 45 The Court, forty-five years later, in U. S. v. Miller,46 held
that Second Amendment prohibitions did not apply to the possession of
a "sawed-off shotgun," as the weapon bore no "reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia." 47
From Cruikshank48 and Presser,49 it would appear that the Supreme
Court interprets the Second Amendment as being only a restriction on
the federal government and not on the states. Miller v. Texas50 permits
state regulation of firearms and U. S. v. Miller5 permits Congressional
regulation of firearms.
The other main Constitutional challenge to effective firearms control
stems from the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution:
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself . . . 52
This Constitutional safeguard against self-incrimination has been ex-
panded by the Supreme Court recently, in three landmark decisions. All
three decisions, Grosso v. United States, 53 Haynes v. United States5 4 and
Marchetti v. United States,55 prohibit self-incrimination by disclosure
required by federal registration requirements.
In the Marchetti case,56 the Supreme Court reversed the petitioner's
conviction for willful failure to register and pay the $50.00 wagering
tax on the grounds that "provisions (of the wagering tax statutes) may
41 Supra n. 39 at 265.
42 153 U.S. 535, 14 S. Ct. 874 (1894).
43 307 U.S. 174, 59 S. Ct. 816 (1939).
44 Supra n. 42.
45 Supra n. 42 at 538.
46 Supra n. 43.
47 Supra n. 43 at 178.
48 Supra n. 36.
49 Supra n. 39.
50 Supra n. 42.
51 Supra n. 43.
52 U.S. Const. amend. V.
53 390 U.S. 62, 88 S. Ct. 709 (1968).
54 390 U.S. 85, 88 S. Ct. 722 (1968).
55 390 U.S. 39, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968).
56 Ibid.
Sept. 1970
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not be employed to punish criminally those persons who have defended
a failure to comply with their requirements with a proper assertion of
the privilege against self-incrimination." 57 In Gross v. United States
8
gamblers were required to file special monthly reports as a prerequisite
to the payment of the excise tax. The Court there held that this required
reporting would be self-incriminatory.
The basis for Fifth Amendment challenges to gun regulation is found
in Haynes v. United States.59 The Court permitted the Fifth Amendment
as a complete defense for willful possession of an unregistered firearm in
violation of the National Firearms Act. Provisions of the Act which
required registration as a condition of possession would be an admission
of unlawful possession.6 0 This decision would seem to pose some real
problems for those gun registration laws which require the registration
of the firearm as opposed to the registration of the one possessing the
firearm.
Ex-felons, drug addicts, habitual drunks and the like who are
usually prohibited by these gun control ordinances from possessing fire-
arms would be required to admit their violation by attempting to register
the weapon. If they chose not to comply with the ordinance, they would
be guilty of a willful failure to register and thereby liable to the extent
of punishment provided for by the ordinance.
In addition to this problem, there is the problem of conffict between
the federal firearms laws and the various state and local laws. There
may conceivably be a class of people who own a federally unregistered
firearm, who as a class may be prohibited from possessing firearms under
state and local laws. This class may successfully argue that the federal
registration law itself provides protection from state prosecution by
claiming Fifth Amendment protection. This argument is based primarily
on Murphy v. Waterfront Commissionpoa which held that "the Constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination protects a State witness against
incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness
against incrimination under State as well as federal law." 60b
Mr. Justice Goldberg believed that "a fair state-individual balance"
is upset "when a witness can be whipsawed into incriminating himself
under both State and federal law even though the constitutional priv-
ilege against self-incrimination is applicable to each." 60c The only logical
solution to this problem would be to either except these forbidden classes
57 Supra n. 55 at 42.
58 Supra n. 53.
59 Supra n. 54.
60 Supra n. 54 at 100.
Goa 378 U.S. 52, 84 S. Ct. 1594 (1964).
GOb Id. at 77-8.
60( Id. at 55.
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from the registration requirements or to provide a grant of immunity
from prosecution for compliance with the registration requirements. Al-
though this seems to weaken the law, it is a possible solution.
The Chicago gun control Ordinance6 ' has presented a workable
solution. The Chicago Gun Registration Law excepted felons from the
requirement of registration.6 2 By the use of this exception, the Chicago
City Council attempted to avoid Fifth Amendment problems over self-
incrimination. This, to date, has proved workable, and in the absence
of Supreme Court clarification, is perhaps the best in existence.
The States have less of a problem with the Constitutional challenges
to gun control legislation. Since the Second Amendment poses no prob-
lem and the Fifth Amendment limitations are not insurmountable, the
States are only limited by the provisions in their own constitutions. The
Ohio Constitution provides that:
The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and se-
curity; but standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to
liberty, and shall not be kept up; and the military shall be in strict
subordination to the civil power.
63
The Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Nieto6 4 and Porello v. State,65 per-
mits the State Legislature to use the police power of the State to protect
the public welfare. As Judge Brenton, of the Montgomery County Com-
mon Pleas Court, writes: "Article I, section iv of the Ohio Constitution
accords the right to bear arms. But this right does not prevent the
legislature from making such police regulations as may be necessary for
the welfare of the public at large concerning the manner in which arms
shall be borne and the use thereof." 66
Municipalities, in Ohio, base their police powers on the Home Rule
grant found in § 3, Art. XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such
local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in con-
flict with general laws.6 7
In a challenge to the Toledo Gun Control Ordinance, it was held in
Photos v. Toledo68 that:
This court can conceive of no matter more concerned with public
safety, health and welfare of the citizens of the City of Toledo than
61 Supra n. 23.
62 Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code, Chs. 11.1-15 (1968).
63 Ohio Const., art. I, § 4 (1851).
64 101 Ohio St. 409, 130 N.E. 663 (1920).
65 121 Ohio St. 280, 168 N.E. 135 (1903).
66 State v. Schutzler, 20 Ohio Misc. 79, 249 N.E. 2d 549 (1969).
67 Ohio Const., art. XVIII, § 3 (1851).
68 19 Ohio Misc. 147, 250 N.E. 2d 916 (1969), affirmed, Ct. of App., Lucas Co., cert.
denied 2-25-70.
Sept. 1970
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that of the indiscriminate purchase and use of firearms, and the
regulation thereof in any manner, not preempted by the state of
Ohio as is done here by a City ordinance, in the form of registration
of the individual rather than the weapon, which should be subject to
the police power of the city of Toledo.69
The public welfare argument was used to uphold New Jersey gun con-
trol legislation in Burton v. Sills.7 0 Judge Connors, in upholding the
Toledo Ordinance, followed and restated the logic of owner registrationas bX7~nn Til Judge T.Pni ;n Rijfn .4Z41l. 71
From the day we are born, when a birth certificate must be re-
corded, we spend the intervening years obtaining licenses to marry,
to drive a motor vehicle, to sell alcoholic beverages, to operate a
barber shop, to practice the learned professions and to do countless
other things, including the obtaining of a license to hunt and fish.
These burdens we assume for the good that flows therefrom. We
find no basic difference in a requirement to obtain a gun purchaser's
identification card.72
Since the Supreme Court of Ohio has not yet ruled on the question
of gun control, the only guiding Ohio case in point is Photos v. Toledo.7
3
There the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the Court of
Appeals "for reasons (that) no substantial constitutional questions exist
herein." 74 By overruling the Appellant's Motion to Certify the Record,
the Ohio Supreme Court refused to overturn the Court of Appeals' find-
ing of a valid exercise of the police power of the State.75 Based upon
this case alone, we must conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court sees no
Constitutional problems to gun control in Ohio.
The Toledo Ordinance was passed on August 12, 1968. Since that
date, two Northern Ohio cities have adopted gun control legislation.
The City of University Heights, the first city in Cuyahoga County to do
so, adopted their ordinance on January 5, 1970 (effective April 1, 1970),
by unanimous vote.7 6 The University Heights Gun Ordinance was pat-
terned after the Toledo Ordinance 77 and required owner registration.
The City of East Cleveland, also in Cuyahoga County, passed their
Gun Control Ordinance on July 29, 1969 (effective May 15, 1970).78 The
East Cleveland Ordinance is also based upon the Toledo Ordinance with
69 Id., 19 Ohio Misc. at 162.
70 99 N.J. Super. 516, 240 A. 2d 462 (1967).
71 Ibid.
72 Supra n. 69.
73 Supra n. 68.
74 Photos v. Toledo, supra n. 68, cert. denied 2-25-70.
75 The Cleveland Press, February 25, 1970, 1.
76 Supra n. 32.
77 Supra n. 31.
78 Supra n. 33.
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one major modification-it requires the registration of the gun as well
as registration of the owner. This modification was added by the City
Commission because "many residents complained that the proposal was
not strong enough." 79
It is clear that these gun control ordinances were adopted in hopes
of precipitating other suburban action. Councilman Emanuel Rose stated
that "within a short time, all the suburbs and Cleveland are expected to
follow us, and when they do, we will sit down together and write an-
other law that will be uniform throughout the county and less difficult
to enforce than the one we just passed." 80 Apparently, the action by
University Heights and East Cleveland triggered little response, except
debate.
There is very little information available to evaluate the effective-
ness of gun control legislation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation on
March 17, 1970 issued its 1969 Preliminary Annual Release of The Uni-
form Crime Reports which revealed some statistics for selected cities.
Among the cities reported were Chicago, Miami, San Francisco and
Toledo-all of which had enacted gun control legislation in 1968. Ex-
amining the data available on the number of "Murder, Non-negligent
Manslaughter," we are able to compare the year 1969 with 1968:
City Murder, Non-negligent Manslaughter
Reporting 1968 1969
Chicago, Ill 647 716
Miami, Fla. 69 72
San Francisco, Calif. 92 127
Toledo, Ohio 22 19
(Statistics based on F.B.I.'s 1969 Preliminary Annual Release,
Uniform Crime Reports)
From what little data there is available, it would appear that gun con-
trol legislation has had little effect on the homicide rates in the above-
mentioned cities. One must remember that the ordinances enacted by
these cities went into effect at different times throughout 1968 and that
it takes a period of time to take effect. The mere enactment of an ordi-
nance will not make all gun owners who are affected go out and im-
mediately register.
It is difficult to foresee the effects of gun control legislation based
on the available data, especially in the face of the ever increasing crime
rates. The city councils of the heavily populated metropolitan areas are
turning toward gun control as, at best, a partial answer to the increase
of crime and violence. As a control of crime, gun control is a question-
able solution. The fact that there are still unsolved Constitutional prob-
79 The Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 11, 1970, 10-C.
80 The Cleveland Press, January 6, 1970, 1.
Sept. 1970
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lems in the area of Fifth Amendment self-incrimination poses a real
threat to the attempted regulation of the criminal possession of firearms.
To state that the concept of gun control is ineffective in the regu-
lation of crime would be to overemphasize the Fifth Amendment prob-
lems. If gun control were an effective method to reduce the number of
guns available in the urban households, then it is quite possible that
many family quarrels and other arguments would not end with some-
one's death. The availability of firearms makes the gun a readily acces-
sible vehicle of violence. If the regulation of this vehicle were more
strict, then perhaps this type of domestic violence would be less frequent.
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol19/iss3/17
